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COMMENT
SEX DISCRIMINATION JUSTIFIED
UNDER TITLE VII: PRIVACY RIGHTS
IN NURSING HOMES
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted by Con-
gress to remove arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to employment
which operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or
other impermissible classifications.2 Title VII's prohibition against
sex-based discrimination in employment, however, is not absolute.
Discrimination in employment based on sex is justified and allowed
under the narrowly construed strictures of Section 703(e) of Title
VII. This provision allows for an exception termed a "bona fide oc-
cupational qualification" (BFOQ). Such an exception is applied to
businesses only if the sex-based employment practice is reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of a particular business or enter-
prise.' A BFOQ exception was granted to a residential retirement
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1976).
2. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). Accord McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-01 (1973).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976), provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges or employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individ-
ual's race, color religion, sex, or national origin.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976) provides, in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ
employees ... on the basis of. .. religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide oc-
cupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise.
As held in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.:
[Cilearly stated, the purpose of the Act was to provide a foundation in the
law for the principle of nondiscrimination. Construing the statute as em-
bodying such a principle is based on the assumption that Congress sought
a formula that would not only achieve the optimum use of our labor
resources but, and more importantly, would enable individuals to develop
as individuals. Attainment of this goal, however, is . . . limited by the
bona fide occupational qualification exception in section 703(e). In constru-
ing this provision, we feel .... that it would be totally anomalous to do so
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home in Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc.5
In Fesel, a male nurse's aide instituted a civil rights action
alleging sex discrimination when he was denied employment at the
defendant-retirement home. A BFOQ was granted the retirement
home based upon the privacy interests of its female guests and the
work responsibilities of its employees. This comment examines how
the holding in Fesel reflects upon the application of Title VII in sex
discrimination cases and the importance of personal privacy in-
terests with respect to facially discriminatory circumstances.
THE FACTS
The defendant, Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc. (the Home),
was a non-profit corporation which rendered services as a residen-
tial retirement home.' The plaintiff, Frederick Fesel, was a
registered nurse.7 In November, 1973, the Home advertised in two
local newspapers for a nurse's aide8 to serve on the midnight shift
and for a nurse's aide to serve on the afternoon shift. Plaintiff, hav-
ing read the ad, called the Home on November 5, 1973, stating that
he desired to apply for the nurse's aide positions? The Director of
Nursing Services at the Home stated that the Home's policy was to
hire only female nurse's aides1" and on that basis refused to hire
Fesel. 1
in a manner that would, in effect, permit the exception to swallow the
rule.
442 F.2d 385, 386-87 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) (emphasis added).
5. Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), affd
mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979).
6. The Home provided twenty-four hour supervision and care for elderly
Masons and their spouses. Id. at 1347-48.
7. In June of 1976, Fesel received his Bachelor of Science degree in Nursing
from the University of Delaware. Id. at 1348.
8. According to Fesel:
The duties of a nurse's aide at the Home in 1973 included the providing of
services involving intimate personal care of both male and female guests
including dressing, bathing, changing of geriatric pads for incontinent pa-
tients, tending to patients with catheters, and assisting in the use of
toilets and bed pans. Nurse's aides . .. provide other functions, however,
which did not involve such personal care including the making of beds,
foot care, reading of mail, feeding, cleaning spills, maintenance of wheel
chairs and the escorting of patients on visits to doctors.
Id. at 1352-53.
9. At the time plaintiff called the Home, he was a third year nursing student
at the University of Delaware. Id. at 1348.
10. When plaintiff applied at the Home, there were twenty-two female guests
and eight male guests residing there. Id. at 1352.
11. Id. at 1348, 1352. After November 5, 1973, the Home filled the two adver-
tised positions, and even a part-time position, with female nurse's aides. Id. at 1348.
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Plaintiff then contacted a female friend and had her call the
Home to apply for a nurse's aide position. She did so, reciting the
same qualifications which Fesel possessed. This woman was im-
mediately urged to visit the Home and complete an application.12
Shortly after this incident with the Home, Fesel responded to a
similar ad for a nurse's aide position at the Methodist Country
House. Fesel was likewise denied a nurse's aide position there due
to his sex."3
Fesel filed charges of discrimination" with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against both the Methodist
Country House and the Home on November 5, 1973. After receiving
a right to sue letter from the EEOC, Fesel brought suit against the
Home for reinstatement," but abandoned this request and eventually
sought "a declaratory judgment and an injunction directing that the
Home cease its alleged discriminatory policy."' 6 The District Court
of Delaware assumed jurisdiction pursuant to Section 706 of Title
VI. 7
The district court denied the Home's motion for summary judg-
ment and held that Fesel had complied with all jurisdictional re-
quirements of Title VII, and required a trial to determine whether a
BFOQ exemption could be granted the Home under the cir-
cumstances. 8 At trial, the court entered judgment against Fesel,
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1349. Plaintiff never filed a lawsuit against the Methodist Country
House because he and the House reached a settlement agreement in 1976 for $750. Id.
at 1348.
16. Id. at 1349.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1976) provides in part:
Each United States district court and each United States court of a place
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of
actions brought under this subchapter. Such an action may be brought in
any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment prac-
tice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the
employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and admin-
istered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would
have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the
respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be
brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his prin-
cipal office . . ..
18. Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1347-48 (1971),
citing its previous ruling in Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 428 F. Supp. 573 (D.
Del. 1977) (this case was the forerunner of the one discussed in this comment, and held,
inter alia, that the Home was not a private membership club for purposes of exemp-
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concluding that the Home had successfully established a BFOQ
defense based upon the privacy interests of its female guests and its
employees' work reponsibilities. Fesel was affirmed without opinion
by the Third Circuit in 1979.
LEGAL ANALYSIS OF TITLE VII IN FESEL
The courts have indicated that the intent and purpose of Con-
gress in enacting Title VII 9 was multi-faceted. 2 The prevention of
tion from the Civil Rights Act). In preparation for trial, the Director of Nursing Ser-
vices at the Home approached nine female guests concerning the affidavit below:
I, - , have been a guest of the Masonic Home of Delaware for
years. I object most strenuously to the employment by the
Home of male nurses or male nurses aides, if they are to attend to my
nursing needs and, if one such is employed to attend to me, I shall do
everything in my power to remove myself from the Home.
Id. at 1352.
All nine female guests who were approached by the Director of Nursing Ser-
vices filled in and signed the affidavit. At trial, eight of the female guests at the Home
testified that they would not consent to the presence of a male nurse's aide, and ob-
jected to being cared for by a male. Seven of the eight who testified had signed the af-
fidavit. Testimony revealed that two of the guest's children were considering removing
their parents if a male nurse's aide was employed by the Home, and one guest's
daughter testified she would definitely remove her mother from the Home under such
circumstances. Id.
19. The Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act is set forth in [1964] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 287, 2355-2519, but makes no reference to the inclusion of
"sex" as a criterion for discrimination. The word "sex" was added to the bill only at
the last moment; therefore, no helpful discussion is present from which to glean the in-
tent of Congress. Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. and Gas Co., 328 F. Supp. 454, 462-63
(D.N.J. 1971). According to Rosen:
The word "sex" was not part of the Civil Rights Bill when it left the
House Rules Committee on January 30, 1964. The actual amendment was
offered by Congressman Smith (D. Va.), a critic of the Bill, and commen-
tators generally agree that the addition was designed to sabotage the Bill.
See: Sex Discrimination in Employment: An Attempt to Interpret Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 1968 Duke L.J. 671 at 676; Vaas, Fran-
cis J., Title VII: Legislative History, 7 Boston College Ind. and Commerce
L. Rev. 431; Comment, 50 Iowa L.R. 778 at 789 et seq. (1965). Hearings
were never held on the amendment and the failure to do so was noted
with alarm by the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Mr.
Celler (D.N.Y.), 110 Cong. Record 2485 (February 8, 1964). Indeed, in the
House the amendment was opposed by the Administration and many sup-
porters of the whole bill. 1968 Duke L.J. supra, at 677-678; 7 B.C. Ind. &
Comm. L. Rev. supra, at 441-42 . . . The word "sex" was adopted by a
vote of 168 to 133 and attempts to qualify the clear word "sex" by amend-
ments were rebuffed. Id. at 678. In the Senate, the bill, as amended,
received both more favorable treatment and Administration support
through Senators Humphrey; Mansfield, Kuchel and Dirksen, 7 B.C. Ind.
& Comm. Law Rev. supra, at 445. Nevertheless, hearings were never held
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disparate treatment of employees (particularly women), the equaliza-
tion of the sexes regarding employment opportunities,2 and the re-
jection of "romantic paternalism" towards women," were major
abstract legislative policy concerns behind the enactment of Title
VII. The primary intent of Congress in Title VII was to provide
equal access to the job market for both men and women' by pro-
hibiting employment standards based on stereotypic characteriza-
tions of a person's sex." Furthermore, from an economic standpoint,
Congress through Title VII endeavored to prohibit wage discrimina-
tion between employees on the basis of sex,"5 and sought to elimi-
nate frictions, tensions and financial inequalities of sex discrimi-
nation in order to benefit and improve the free flow of commerce
between states."8
and debate concentrated largely on the racial provisions of the bill. The
Senate did broaden the provisions in what is now § 2000e-2 to cover all
agencies as well as private employers.
Id. at 445 n.4.
20. See Annot., 12 A.L.R. Fed. 15 (1972).
21. Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 991 (1971). (Sprogis considered the discharge of a female airline hostess for get-
ting married and also held that the intent of Congress was to strike at the entire spec-
trum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes).
22. Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. and Gas Co., 328 F. Supp. 454, 464 (D.C.N.J.
1970). See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973); Weeks v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1969).
23. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir.), cerL
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). The court held that since the amendment adding the word
"sex" to "race, color, religion and national origin," was adopted one day before the
House passed the bill, it was reasonable to assume that one of Congress' main goals
was to provide equal access to the job market for both men and women as well as to
provide a foundation in the law for the principle of nondiscrimination.
24. Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (D.C. Ohio 1971).
25. The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976), must be considered
in conjunction with Title VII in determining wage discrimination cases. Rosen v. Public
Serv. Elec. and Gas Co., 328 F. Supp. 454, 463 (D.C.N.J. 1970).
The EEOC, in its sex discrimination guidelines in 29 CFR § 1604.8 dealing
with the relationship between Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, provides
that (a) the employee coverage of the prohibitions against discrimination
based on sex contained in Title VII is coextensive with that of the other
prohibitions contained in Title VII and is not limited by 42 USCS §
2000e-2(h) to those employees covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act
that (b) by virtue of § 2000e-2(h), a defense based on the Equal Pay Act
may be raised in a proceeding under Title VII, and that (c) where such a
defense is raised, the Commission will give appropriate consideration to
the interpretations of the Administrator, Wage and Hour Division,
Department of Labor, but will not be bound thereby.
Annot., 12 A.L.R. Fed., supra note 20, at 33.
26. Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 284 F. Supp. 956 (D.C. Cal.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 993 (1968).
1980]
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Discrimination based on sex is permitted, however, under Title
VII by the application of BFOQ exemptions in narrowly construed
circumstances." In full recognition of the narrow circumstances
where BFOQ exemptions can be applied, the court in Fesel held:
[W]hen an employer defends a sex discrimination action
by raising the privacy interests of its customers as the
basis for a BFOQ defense, the employer must prove not
only that it had a factual basis for believing that the hir-
ing of any members of one sex would directly undermine
the essence of the job involved or the employer's
business, but also that it could not assign job respon-
sibilities selectively in such a way that there would be
minimal clash between the privacy interests of the
customers and the non-discrimination principle of Title
VII.28
Relying on this analysis the court in Fesel held that it was not
feasible for the Home to hire a male nurse's aide. The court found
that the Home had shown a factual basis for believing that the
employment of a male nurse's aide would directly undermine the
essence of the Home's business operation, because many female
guests objected to intimate personal care by males. Moreover, due
to its size, the Home could not employ a large staff. Because of the
nature of employee scheduling, the Home could not employ a male
nurse's aide for any available work shift where there would be at
least one female on duty to attend to the personal care needs of the
female guests who objected to male care.' Therefore, the court held
that a BFOQ defense based upon the privacy interests of the Home's
guests and the infeasibility of selective job responsibilities among
employees was proper under these narrow circumstances.'
27. See notes 48 and 49 infra. A BFOQ has been defined as discrimination
which is accomplished by establishing a job qualification that eliminates only members
of one sex, or which is capable of fulfillment only by members of one sex. Note, Sex
Discrimination in Employment An Attempt to Interpret Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 1968 DUKE L.J. 671, 688. BFOQ exemptions have not always been granted
however. In Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388-89 (5th Cir.),
cerL denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). The court held that being a female was not a BFOQ
for the job of flight cabin attendant, and the employer's refusal to hire plaintiff solely
because of his sex constituted violation of the 1964 Civil Rights Acts. In Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), however, the court granted a BFOQ exemption to the
Alabama Board of Corrections when it appeared that women guards in contact posi-
tions in maximum security male penetentiaries posed a substantial security problem.
Id.
28. 447 F. Supp. at 1351.
29. Id. at 1354.
30. Id.
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BFOQ LITIGATION REQUIREMENTS
In Title VII litigation, the plaintiff has the initial burden of
showing a prima facie case of discrimination. After a prima facie
case of discrimination is made, the employer has the burden of prov-
ing that any alleged discriminatory employment practices justify the
application of a BFOQ exemption. In Fesel, the Home overcame
plaintiffs prima facie case of discrimination when the court held
that the Home's hiring practices and employee scheduling problems
justified the application of a BFOQ exemption.
Requirement That Plaintiff Show Prima Facie Case
In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Fesel
had to comply with the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Dothard v. Rawlinson.3' Dothard was a Title VII sex discrimina-
tion case where a female applicant for a correctional counselor posi-
tion in the Alabama state penitentiary system was rejected because
she failed to meet the minimum height-weight requirements under
Alabama law. The female applicant challenged the statutory height-
weight requirements as violative of Title VII. Regarding the re-
quirement that a plaintiff show a prima facie case, the Supreme
Court in Dothard held: "To establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, a plaintiff need only show that the facially neutral
standards in question select applicants for hire in a significantly
discriminatory pattern."3 This requirement grew out of earlier
Supreme Court decisions" which held that Title VII was not con-
cerned with an employer's absence of discriminatory intent, since
"Congress directed the thrust of the act to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation."' The plaintiff
need only show that hiring standards on their face conspicuously
31. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
32. Id. at 329.
33. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 439 (1971).
34. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). See also Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 423 (1975). As stated in Albemarle:
Title VII itself recognizes a complete, but very narrow, immunity for
employer conduct shown to have been undertaken "in good faith, in con-
formity with, and in reliance on any written interpretation or opinion of
the [Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b).
It is not for the courts to upset this legislative choice to recognize only a
narrowly defined "good faith" defense.
Id. at 423 n.17.
1980]
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demonstrate a job requirement's significantly discriminatory
impact."
To determine whether a complainant has satisfactorily shown
that an employer selected job applicants in a significantly dis-
criminatory pattern, the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green" provided an intricate test. The complainant, accord-
ing to McDonnell Douglas, must show that he belongs to a minority
and that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants. Furthermore, he must prove that
he was rejected despite his qualifications and that the position re-
mained open after his rejection. Finally, the complainant must show
that after his rejection, the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons of complainant's qualifications. 7 In the Fesel case, the
applicant demonstrated that men were in the minority in the nurse's
aide profession. He also demonstrated his credentials as a qualified
nurse's aide and that he was nevertheless rejected because of his
sex. Following his rejection, the position he applied for remained
open and the Home continued seeking applicants.' Therefore, under
both Dothard and McDonnell Douglas, Fesel fulfilled the re-
quirements in establishing a prima facie case of sex discrimination.
Employer Has Burden of Proof
Shifting the burden of proof to the party claiming the benefits
of the BFOQ exemption has been long established as the rule in
BFOQ sex discrimination cases. 9 Yet, the burden of proof shifts only
when a Title VII plaintiff has demonstrated a prima facie case that
35. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977). The defendant-employer
though is free to adduce countervailing evidence of his own if the employer discerns
falacies or deficiencies in the evidence offered by the plaintiff. Id.
36. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
37. Id. at 802. It is important to note that the test quoted above was
specifically applied in McDonnell Douglas to establish a prima facie case of racial
discrimination. However, the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas noted its applica-
tion to other discrimination actions, but stated:
The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification
above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily
applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.
Id. at 802 n.13. See East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 337 (5th Cir. 1975) where the
court applied the McDonnell-Douglas test in a sex discrimination case.
38. 447 F. Supp. at 1349.
39. The court in Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232
(5th Cir. 1969) held: "[Wihen dealing with a humanitarian remedial statute which
serves an important public purpose, it has been the practice to cast the burden of
proving an exception to the general policy of the statute upon the person claiming it."
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 [1980], Art. 6
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an employer's hiring standards are discriminatory.' Once established,
the burden shifts to the employer to prove that any discriminatory
hiring practice which he uses has a "manifest relationship to the
employment in question.""' If an employer meets the burden of prov-
ing that his hiring standards are "job related" BFOQ exemptions,
the plaintiff may then show that other standards or selection
devices serve the "employer's legitimate interest in efficient and
trustworthy workmanship"' 2 without discriminatory effects.'3
Fesel established a prima facie case," and therefore the
burden of proof shifted to the Home "to articulate some legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for, or a statutory defense to, plaintiffs
rejection" as a nurse's aide at the Home." Accordingly, the court
thus properly required the Home to show that its hiring practices
were acceptable as a BFOQ exemption. However, if an employer does
not prove preponderantly that his discriminatory employment stand-
ards justify a BFOQ exemption, then the plaintiff is entitled to
varied forms of relief.
Remedies Applicable in BFOQ Cases
Title VII, Section 706(g),'" as amended by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972, provides that if a court finds that an
employer has engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful
employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin
the defendant-employer from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice(s), and may order such affirmative action as may be ap-
propriate-such as reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
without back pay. According to Section 706(g), Fesel's request for an
40. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 426 (1975).
41. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). Accord Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 426
(1975); Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34, 39 (5th Cir. 1974).
42. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 426 (1975), (quoting McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)). Accord Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
43. One writer has posited the idea that the burden of proving a BFOQ ex-
emption should properly be on a defendant-employer, since he is in a better position
than the plaintiff to know whether the particular facts of his operation justify the use
of sex as a BFOQ. Note, Developments, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1169 (1971).
44. See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
45. 447 F. Supp. at 1349. Judge Stapleton's view here is an almost verbatim
quote from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
19801
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injunction directing the Home to cease its alleged discriminatory
hiring policy was proper.47 After Fesel established a prima facie
discrimination case, the court proceeded to apply the substantive
aspect of Title VII to the facts.
APPLICATION OF TITLE VII IN FESEL
BFOQ Cases Are Narrowly Construed
In applying Section 703(e) of Title VII, the Fesel court adhered
to both the EEOC guidelines" and recent case law 9 and held that
BFOQ cases must be narrowly construed exceptions to the general
prohibition against sex discrimination. The district court in Fesel, in
applying the BFOQ exemption, relied on the virtually uniform view
of the federal courts that Section 703(e) provides only the most nar-
row exceptions to the general view requiring equality of employ-
ment opportunities.5 0 However, the courts have had some difficulty
in agreeing upon the meaning of the term "narrowly construed."
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Diaz v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc.,5" held that sex-based discrimination under Section
703(e) is valid when the essence of a business operation would be
undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively. 5 On the
other hand, in Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,O it was held
that a BFOQ exemption may exist in the narrow circumstance where
an employee proves that he had reasonable cause for believing that
47. 447 F. Supp. at 1349. Another BFOQ nursing profession case is Wilson v.
Sibley Memorial Hospital, 340 F. Supp. 686 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 488
F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court there held that both injunctive and back pay
relief are available under § 706(g), and such relief is applicable even though plaintiff
will not directly benefit from such relief. Such was the case in Fesel. Fesel would not
directly have benefited from a decision in his favor since he was employed by the Air
Force during the trial. 447 F. Supp. at 1348.
48. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1977) states in part:
(a) The Commission believes that the bona fide occupational qualification
exception as to sex should be interpreted narrowly....
49. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977); McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1976); Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1974);
Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 380 F. Supp. 197 (D.C.S.C. 1973).
50. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977).
51. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). Another formula-
tion of this view is given in Rosen v. Public Service & Gas Co., 328 F. Supp. 454, 462
(D.C.N.J. 1970). The court directed that sex is a BFOQ exception only if it is
"reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business."
52. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
53. 325 F. Supp. 467 (D.C. Pa. 1971). Accord Phillips v. Martin Marietta, 400
U.S. 542 (1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir.
1969).
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substantially all persons of one sex (women) would be unable to per-
form safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved." Whatever
the verbal formulation, the federal courts, as well as the Supreme
Court, have agreed that "it is impermissible under Title VII to
refuse to hire an individual woman or man on the basis of
stereotyped characterizations of the sexes ...."I'
The court in Fesel held that rejection of Frederick Fesel for
the nurse's aide position at the Home was based on just such
stereotypic assumptions., However, the court reasoned that per-
sonal privacy interests of the Home's female guests were also im-
plicated in the case. It held that these privacy interests must be pro-
tected by law and recognized by the employer while running his
business.57 To support this conclusion, the court held that in some in-
stances personal privacy interests justify sex-based employment
discrimination by an employer. 9 Thus, personal privacy interests in
Fesel qualified as a narrow exception to the general prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of sex.
Selective Work Responsibilities Are Required If Possible
Despite this narrow exception, when the BFOQ defense is based
on privacy interests there must be an additional showing by the
employer that it would not be feasible to assign job responsibili-
54. Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 325 F. Supp. 467, 469 (D.C. Pa.
1971).
55. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977).
56. 447 F. Supp. at 1352.
57. Id.
58. Judge Stapleton declared in Fesel that there were two types of cases
which deal with the BFOQ defense: (1) discrimination of an employer due to his percep-
tion of the physical capabilities of a certain sex; and (2) discrimination due to an
employer's perception of the privacy interests of his clients or customers. 447 F. Supp.
at 1350. This declaration is not altogether accurate. For instance, an employer's
perception may be discriminatory due to: (1) religious differences between applicants,
see generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976); (2) national origin of applicants, see generally
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976), under § 2000e-2, the term "national origin" on its face refers
to the country where a person was born, or more broadly, the country from which his
or her ancestors came and was not intended to embrace the requirement of United
States citizenship, Long v. California State Personnel Bd., 41 Cal. App. 3d 1000, 116
Cal. Rptr. 562 (1974); (3) social stereotyping or customer preference, see generally 29
C.F.R. § 1604.2(1) (ii)-(iii) (1977); (4) "business necessity." Practices which are not inten-
tionally discriminatory or neutral but perpetuate consequences of past discrimination
may be permitted because of their overriding business necessity. Pettway v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974). Accord Head v. Limken Roller Bearing
Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973).
59. 447 F. Supp. at 1351.
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ties." In Meith v. Dothard,1 the court was convinced that selective
work responsibilities should be used in BFOQ-privacy interest cases
to alleviate much of the legitimate concern regarding privacy rights
without denying job opportunities to members of one sex.2 After a
detailed discussion regarding selectivity of job responsibilities, 3 the
court in Fesel held that any configuration of selective work
schedules presented opportunities where it would be necessary for
Fesel to perform intimate personal care for non-consenting female
guests without female assistance. The court then held that selective
work possibilities implemented to minimize sex discrimination must
give way to the right of privacy demanded by female guests." Selec-
tive job assignment was not feasible (due to Masonic's small
staff) since a female "swing person" would have to have been hired
as an aide during those hours which Fesel would have been alone on
duty. Any duty of the Home to accommodate the rights of prospec-
tive male employees did not require the employment of additional
personnel."
Because injunctive relief was held to be inappropriate in Fesel,
the court declined to consider the possibility of selective job assign-
ment during the 1 p.m. - 9 p.m. shift. Since positions at the Home
were held open occasionally to accommodate future employees,
Fesel's application could have been retained for the 1 p.m. - 9 p.m.
shift when an opening would become available. Working on the 1
p.m. - 9 p.m. shift, moreover, would never have left Fesel alone with
the Home's guests.'
60. Id.
61. 418 F. Supp. 1169, 1185 (M.D. Ala. 1976), affd in part rev'd in part sub
nom., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (reversed part not pertinent here).
62. Id at 1185. See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 346 (1977), (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); Reynolds v. Wise, 375 F. Supp. 145, 151 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
63. 447 F. Supp. at 1353. The court determined that the best selective work
schedule for plaintiff-the 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. shift Monday to Friday-required that
plaintiff be alone with non-consenting female guests for only two hours a day for two
days a week. Because of the unpredictability of intimate care requiring bodily contact,
the court believed the period of time plaintiff would have been alone with complaining
female guests was still too long. However, the two hour time period in which Fesel
would have been alone with the Home's guests was minimized as an extended period
of individual male care since (1) many guests could take care of their personal needs
and (2) only thirty percent of a nurse's aide's time was spent attending personal needs
of guests. See 447 F. Supp. at 1353 nn.7 & 8.
64. Id. at 1353.
65. Id. at 1354. Cf. Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977),
which was a religious discrimination case under Section 701(J) of Title VII. There the
Supreme Court held that in accommodating the religious needs of employees, an
employer need not bear more than de minimus expenses.
66. 447 F. Supp. at 1354 n.13. See also Plaintiffs Opening Post-Trial Brief, pp.
12-13.
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FESEL -PROTECTOR OF FACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY SETTINGS
The setting in Fesel clearly reveals facially discriminatory
practices by the Home. Such circumstances have been described,
however, as "unalterable conditions," 7 since sexual or personal
privacy rights are held by society in high esteem. By honoring the
individual privacy interest of the Home's female guests, the court in
Fesel indirectly attacked the integrity of the medical profession,
undermined the EEOC guidelines on sex discrimination, and yielded
to existing social prejudices which Title VII intended to eliminate.
Even more alarmingly, it overlooked the fact that cross-sexual care
already existed at the Home, and expanded without warrant the
constitutional right to privacy.
The Effect of Fesel on the Medical Profession
The ruling in Fesel attacked the integrity of the medical pro-
fession. The medical profession trains its doctors and nurses to treat
both sexes, but Fesel limits the stance taken by the medical profes-
sion by not permitting male nurse's aides to care for all retirement
home guests. To be sure, the intimacy and dignity of the Home's
guests must be sincerely respected," but the court failed to
recognize that both male and female nurse's aides can offer compe-
tent and professional personal care. The court received no evidence
that men were incapable of providing adequate care or could not
respect a woman's privacy. 9
67. See Note, 84 HARV. L. REV., supra note 43, at 1185-86 based on 110 Cong.
Rec. 2918 (1964)). As stated in the Note, Representative Goodell offered on the floor in
Congress the example of an elderly woman who desires a female nurse as a situation
where a BFOQ exemption should be granted. Such a setting was considered an
"unalterable condition" sanctioning discriminatory hiring practices. Representative
Goodell's remark, however, was not made in the course of any debate or exchange as
to the meaning of any term. Nor was the remark made or introduced for the purposes
of legislative history. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S.
290, 318 (1896) (Debates in Congress are generally not appropriate sources of informa-
tion because it is impossible to determine with certainty what construction was put
upon an act by the members of Congress). Accord United States v. Kung Chen Fur
Corp., 188 F.2d 577, 584 (Cust. & Pat. App. 1951).
68. See LeBlang, Invasion of Privacy: Medical Practice and the Tort of Intru-
sion, 18 WASHBURN L. REv. 205 (1979).
69. Contra to the ruling in Fesel, it has been reported that nursing gender
matters little to the patient receiving proper care, and mutual respect between males
and females in the nursing profession is certain to eliminate any role-reversal conflicts.
It is also foreseen that more men will enter occupational health nursing, and that male
nurses or nurse's aides will have a great deal to contribute to the protection of the
health and safety of our country's work force. Associated Press, Males are Drawn to
Industrial Nursing, The Grand Rapids Press, Aug. 3, 1978, at 2-C col. 1.
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It would not have been unreasonable for the court to have
assumed in Fesel that female guests would have engendered the
same respect for male nurse's aides as male guests had for female
aides. Professional demeanor by male nurse's aides should engender
the same respect which women display for male obstetrician-
gynecologists. Such respect should occur even though society ex-
pects nurses or nurse's aide- to be female and its doctors to be
male.
Ironically, the female guests in Fesel who had complained
about care by a male nurse's aide had been individually treated by a
male gynecologist."0 The female guests considered medical treatment
by a male gynecologist not to be an intrusion of their privacy in-
terests. It is unclear why they found proposed treatment by a male
nurse's aide to be such an invasion. Respect existed for the male
gynecologist but not for a male nurse's aide.
The court followed the female guests prejudice instead of the
anti-discriminatory purposes of Title VII. The suggestion implicit in
the privacy argument in Fesel was that female guests could not
respect male nurse's aides, and that male aides were less profes-
sional than their female counterparts.7" This was an unfair indict-
ment of the professionalism of male nurse's aides. In making such an
indictment it perpetuated the prejudiced view toward male aides,
and failed to carry out the forward-looking purposes of Title VII,
namely, to prohibit unfair and stereotyped employment practices. In
addition, the court failed to take into account the capacity of the
female guests to eventually adjust to and respect male nurse's aides.
Thus, the privacy argument in Fesel screened out other important
considerations.
Fesel Undermines the EEOC Guidelines on Sex Discrimination
Besides underestimating the professionalism of nurse's aides
and the capacity for change in the opinions of retirement home
guests, the Fesel court did not properly implement the EEOC
guidelines on sex discrimination."2 One guideline on sex discrimina-
tion requires that individual job applicants be given an opportunity
70. Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del. Inc., 428 F. Supp. 573, 579 n.19 (D. Del.
1977). See note 18 supra.
71. See generally Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 346 n.5 (1977) (Marshall,
J., dissenting). Justice Marshall applied this view to restrictions regarding the employ-
ment of women in Alabama penetentiaries.
72. 447 F. Supp. at 1349-50.
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to demonstrate his.or her capacity for a job."3 This guideline was
violated by the Home when Fesel was not given an opportunity to
be considered on the basis of his own individual capacities. In
Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co.,7" the Ninth Circuit held that the
purpose of Title VII was to put men and women on equal footing in
the job market."5 In deference to the EEOC guidelines and Title VII,
the Rosenfeld court held that equality of footing among men and
women in the employment process is established only upon a show-
ing of individual capacity for a job." Demonstration of individual
capacity for a job is in accord with Congressional purpose under
Title VII."
Furthermore, Fesel dealt a blow to the EEOC guideline deny-
ing an employer a BFOQ exemption when an employer refuses to
hire an individual because of the preferences of its customers."
73. As stated in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1) (1977):
The Commission will find that the following situations do not warrant the
application of the bona fide occupational qualification ....
(ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped
characterizations of the sexes .... The principle of nondiscrimination re-
quires that individuals be considered on the basis of individual capacities
and not on the basis of any characteristics generally attributed to the
group.
Therefore, each individual applicant must have an opportunity to demonstrate his or
her capacity for the job. Jurinko v. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038, 1044 (3rd Cir. 1973);
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 1969).
74. 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
75. Id. at 1224-25.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1) (1977) also states:
The Commission will find that the following situations do not warrant the
application of the bona fide occupational qualification ....
(iii) The refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of
co-workers, the employer's clients or customers (emphasis added).
The guidelines were enacted by the EEOC to keep the BFOQ exception regard-
ing sex discrimination as narrow as possible. See note 48 supra. Section 1604.2 of the
EEOC guidelines is still in effect. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1979).
Clearly, customer preference alone will not justify the granting of a BFOQ ex-
emption. In Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971), the Seventh Circuit held that passenger or customer
preference for single stewardesses was violative of the EEOC guidelines, and was an
invalid reason for the application of a BFOQ exemption. Furthermore, in Diaz v. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 950
(1971), the Fifth Circuit specifically affirmed the EEOC guideline against discrimination
based on customer preference, despite the fact that Pan Am's passengers preferred
female stewardesses over male stewards. Id. at 387. The Diaz court upheld this guide-
1980]
Kingma: Sex Discrimination Justified Under Title VII: Privacy Rights in N
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1980
592 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
Fesel debilitated the mandatory guideline when it permitted the
Home to refuse to hire a male nurse's aide because of the prefer-
ences of its female guests. In effect, Fesel provided a privacy in-
terest exception to the guideline.79
The Supreme Court in Dothard v. Rawlinson ° has stated that
the EEOC guidelines pertaining to sex discrimination and the BFOQ
exemption can be accorded weight by the courts since the EEOC
has consistently adhered to the principle that the BFOQ as to sex
should be interpreted narrowly." Fesel, however, glossed over these
guidelines.2
line even though the trial court found, based on expert testimony of a psychiatrist,
that passenger psychological needs were better attended to by females in the unique
environment of an airplane cabin. Id. The court stressed that "discrimination based on
sex is valid only when the essence of the business operation would be undermined by
not hiring members of one sex exclusively." Id. at 388. The gender of attendants on
the airline did not go to the essence of the airline's business, thus, the court found dis-
crimination under Title VII. Id Regarding customer preference as to the gender of at-
tendants, the Diaz court stated:
While we recognize that the public's expectation of finding one sex in a
particular role may cause some initial difficulty, it would be totally
anomalous if we were to allow the preferences and prejudices of the cus-
tomers to determine whether the sex discrimination was valid. Indeed, it
was, to a large extent, these very prejudices . . . [Title VIII was meant to
overcome. Thus, we feel that customer preference may be taken into ac-
count only when it is based on the company's inability to perform the
primary function or service it offers.
Id. at 389. Therefore, sex based discrimination must be founded on business necessity,
not on business convenience or general public expectations. Id. at 388-89.
The court in Fesel endeavored to satisfy the "business necessity" requirement
by holding that the employment of male nurse's aides would directly have undermined
the Home's business and its ability to perform the services it offered. 447 F. Supp. at
1353. Whether the sex of nurse's aides at the Home was crucial to successful job per-
formance and to the essence of the Home's operation, see note 82, infra.
79. 447 F. Supp. at 1352.
80. 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
81. IM Fesel asserts that the Supreme Court in Dothard only approved Sec-
tion 1604.2(a) of the guidelines regarding the EEOC's stand toward the narrowness of
the BFOQ exception. 447 F. Supp. at 1349-50. See note 48 supra. Contrariwise, the im-
port of the dicta in Dothard promotes the conclusion that the construction of Title VII
by the EEOC in its guidelines can be accorded weight by the courts because the EEOC
has consistently adhered to the principle that the BFOQ exception was meant to be an
extremely narrow one. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 n.19 (1977). One court
has held that EEOC guidelines on sex discrimination are entitled to considerable
weight. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 442 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
82. Furthermore, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (1979) of the guidelines states:
Where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness, the
Commission will consider sex to be a bona fide occupational qualification,
e.g. an actor or actress.
In interpreting Section 1604.2(a)(2) the court in Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac.
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The Court Yielded to Social Prejudices Which Title VII Was
Designed to Eliminate
In addition to underestimating the professionalism of male
nurse's aides and undermining the EEOC guidelines, the court in
Fesel bowed to discriminatory social prejudices which Title VII was
designed to eliminate." The continuance of society's prejudices has
ultimately deprived men of job opportunities, has stymied male
nurse's aides from obtaining equality in the nursing profession, and
has weakened the regulatory power and purpose of the Civil Rights
Act. The proper solution in Fesel should not have been the limita-
tion of employment opportunities of men (or women) who desired to
contribute to their community as nurse's aides, but the eradication
of existing social preferences and occupational stereotypes by re-
quiring the timely and careful selection of competent male and
female nurse's aides who are understanding of human intimacy and
dignity."' In Title VII actions, courts must strive to eliminate
discrimination in employment practices when justification for such
practices rests ultimately on societal preferences. Requiring the
timely and careful selection of competent male and female nurse's
aides will ultimately improve society by upholding the profes-
sionalism of nurse's aides and the dignity of those receiving the
care. The thrust of the Fesel holding indicates the judicial
favoritism of inconsistent "customer preference" by the female
guests regarding medical treatment from men, over the objectives
of Title VII.
Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 1971), stated that a BFOQ under the EEOC
guidelines would be granted only if the inherent sexual characteristics of an employee
are crucial to the successful performance of a job. Since the medical profession consists
of both men and women, and because it trains its doctors and nurses to treat both
sexes, the sexual characteristics of medical professionals, especially nurse's aides, are
not an essential factor for successful job performance (with the exception of a wet
nurse). Neither are the intrinsic attributes of one sex a necessary qualification in
becoming a nurse's aide. See Note, 84 HARV. L. REv., supra note 43, at 1178-79. The
Note writer contended that sex itself, rather than abilities which are roughly cor-
related with it, should be the guidepost in determining whether sex is an essential
component of job function. This view was followed in Rosenfeld and is contrary to the
interpretation of "successful job performance" posited in FeseL 447 F. Supp. at 1353.
Fesel adverted that successful job performance hinged on whether the female guests
at the Home would accept care by a male nurse's aide. Id. However, whether or not a
person consents to treatment or care from a medical professional has no bearing on
whether the medical professional can, in the first place, adequately treat that person in
a dignified and respectable manner. Thus, the BFOQ was improperly granted in Fesel
according to the EEOC guidelines and case law interpreting them.
83. See text accompanying notes 19-26 supra.
84. Timely and careful selection based on individually demonstrated
capacities.
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Concern for Privacy Interests: An Excuse for Discrimination
The Fesel court upheld the female guests' preference for a
female nurse's aide because it felt compelled to protect their privacy
interests. However, the Fesel decision seems to use the privacy in-
terest rationale as an effective discriminatory device. The danger in
this context is that the court and the Home used prevailing pre-
judices and Section 703(e) to mask persisting discriminatory at-
titudes and justify the court's granting of a BFOQ exemption. The
court's discussion seemingly turned upon our society's acceptance of
legally indefensible occupational stereotypes. Although male Home
guests did not complain of privacy invasion by female nurse's
aides,85 the court made no mention of the fact that male Home
guests received daily care exclusively from female nurse's aides.
Such cross-sexual nursing care actually existed at the Home, yet
this fact was overlooked. The court's professed concern for the
privacy interests of the nonconsenting female guests appears a con-
venient excuse for discrimination."
The Constitutional Right to Privacy Was Expanded Without
Warrant in Fesel
The objectives of Title VII were abandoned in Fesel in favor of
the complaining female guests' alleged privacy interests,87 and the
Home's hiring practice which accommodated its guests' preference
for female aides was deemed a BFOQ exemption under Title VII. 8
The expansion of the right to privacy in Fesel to include the Home's
customer-guest preferences was legally unwarranted.89 The court in
Fesel cited two federal district court cases,"' one Pennsylvania state
85. 447 F. Supp. at 1353 n.5. The preferences of the male guests were not ex-
plored at trial since none of the male guests objected to care by female nurse's aides.
86. See note 71 supra. One possible reason why the issue of male subjection
to exclusive female nursing care was never questioned or why testimony by male
Home guests was not taken at trial, is that both litigant parties were ingrained with
social mores that nurse's aides should be female. Albeit, the possibility exists that
male Home guests were just overlooked as a potential issue group or testimonial
source.
87. The court interchangeably used "privacy interests" and "right to privacy"
in its discussion. 447 F. Supp. at 1350-51.
88. Id.
89. See text accompanying notes 99-113.
90. Meith v. Dothard, 418 F. Supp. 1169, 1185 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd in part
rev'd in part sub nom. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Reynolds v. Wise,
375 F. Supp. 145, 151 (N.D. Tex. 1974). In Meith and Reynolds, the courts permitted by
BFOQ exception the exclusion of women from employment in correctional officer posi-
tions in penetentiaries when selective work responsibilities did not insure the privacy
of inmates during strip searches and frisks. When the Supreme Court reviewed Meith,
it did not reach the privacy issue.
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court case,91 and an EEOC decision 2 to support its conclusion that
the Home's assertion of its guests' right to privacy was permissible
as a BFOQ exemption in sex discrimination cases. All cases cited in
Fesel were sex discrimination cases containing discussions on
privacy relating to BFOQ exemptions, but dealing with strip searches
and inspections in disciplinary facilities of adult prison inmates or
children. Each case held that the privacy interests of the detainees
during strip inspections were to be zealously protected, although the
adult prisoners or children, to some extent, had compromised their
constitutionally guaranteed rights for the purpose of discipline and
supervision. Yet, only one of the cases cited in Fesel actually
endeavored to define the privacy right involved. In City of
Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission,94 the
issue was whether children in a youth home should be subject to
strip inspections by members of the opposite sex. The proposed
strip inspections by youth home supervisors were held to abuse the
penumbral guarantees emanating from the Bill of Rights" as
declared in Griswold v. Connecticut." Having the children's bodies
subjected to inspections by members of the opposite sex appeared
to abridge their right of privacy. Thus, the City of Philadelphia
court required inspection during strip searches only by supervisory
personnel of the same sex as the children inspected. 7
The quintessence of the privacy interest cases cited in Fesel
appears to be the promotion of the fourth amendment privacy right
of people to secure their persons from unreasonable searches. The
reliance by the Fesel court on cases impliedly emanating a fourth
amendment privacy right posture, in order to advocate the privacy
rights of female guests over the objectives of Title VII, was un-
justified under the definition of privacy enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Whalen v. Roe."
91. City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 7 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 500, 300 A.2d 97 (1973). In City of Philadelphia, a BFOQ exemption was
granted to a city Youth Study Center housing children with emotional problems, in
order that supervision of children while they disrobed and were searched for contra-
band would be done by supervisors of the same sex.
92. EEOC Decision, 71-2410, 4 F.E.P. 17 (1971).
93. 447 F. Supp. at 1354.
94. 7 Pa. Cmwlth. 500, 300 A.2d 97, 103 (1973).
95. Id at 103 n.8.
96. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
97. 7 Pa. Cmwlth. 500, 300 A.2d 97, 103 (1973).
98. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
99. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). Professor Tribe of Harvard has stated Whalen to be
the Supreme Court's most comprehensive attempt thus far to define the constitutional
right of privacy. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-1 (1978).
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The controversy in Whalen stemmed from a New York statute
requiring that the state be provided with a copy of every prescrip-
tion for certain dangerous legitimate drugs and invoked security
measures for protecting such information while in the state's posses-
sion. The Court held that disclosure of private medical information
to representatives of the state did not automatically amount to an
impermissible invasion of privacy.'00 The Court also expressed that
the right of privacy, "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," was
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment."' In at-
tempting to characterize the parameters of the constitutional right
to privacy, Justice Stevens in Whalen quoted Professor Kurland,
who stated:
The concept of a constitutional right of privacy still re-
mains largely undefined. There are at least three facets
that have been partially revealed, but their form and
shape remain to be fully ascertained. The first is the right
of the individual to be free in his private affairs from
governmental surveillance and intrusion. The second is
the right of an individual not to have his private affairs
made public by the government. The third is the right of
an individual to be free in action, thought, experience, and
belief from governmental compulsion." 2
The first of the facets, stated Justice Stevens, was directly pro-
tected by the fourth amendment."3 The second facet embraced "the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters."'"" The
third facet involved one's distinct "interest in independence in mak-
ing certain kinds of important decisions."'0 5 Therefore, the right of
privacy, although subject to mutation by the Supreme Court, is
presently delineated into three facets.
Ultimately, the Home's BFOQ revolved around the third facet
of Professor Kurland's definition stated in Whalen. The Fesel court
essentially held that the preference of the Home's female guests in
demanding medical care by female nurse's aides concerned their
right to independently make "certain kinds of important decisions."
However, the expansion of the third facet of the privacy definition
in Whalen to cover the Home's female guests' preference, exceeded
100. 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977).
101. I& at 598 n.23.
102. Id. at 599 n.24.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 500.
105. Id. at 599-600.
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the types of important, personal decisions one can make under the
right to privacy construct. The Title VII privacy right cases which
Fesel cited dealt with "searches" encompassed by the first facet of
the privacy definition in Whalen, and were directly protected by the
fourth amendment.' ° Fesel, however, was not a search case. To the
contrary, the privacy issue in Fesel actually pertained to the third
facet of the Whalen definition, and was controlled by Roe v. Wade,"
Paul v. Davis,"°8 and Whalen itself'-cases specifically alluding to
the third facet of the privacy definition. Whalen, the most recent of
the three, reiterated the Supreme Court's position that a person's
privacy right to independently make important decisions referred
only to "matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, and child rearing and education. In these areas,
it has been held that there are limitations on the States' power to
substantively regulate conduct."'1 0 Whalen, Roe, and Paul therefore
confine a person's constitutional privacy right in making certain im-
portant decisions to marital and familial relations."'
Thus, when Fesel was decided, no constitutionally protected
privacy right existed under the holdings of the Supreme Court as to
personal decisions outside marital and familial relations, especially
with respect to choosing the gender of nurse's aides in a retirement
home. Furthermore, case authority would even controvert a claim
that the female guests in Fesel had an unlimited right to do with
their bodies as they pleased. As Justice Blackmun noted in his ma-
jority opinion in Roe v. Wade,"' the right to privacy has not been
expanded to contain an absolute, unlimited right to do with one's
body as one pleases."' Overall, the female guests' preference in
106. See also Sutton v. National Distillers Products Co., 445 F. Supp. 1319,
1327 (S.D. Ohio 1978), which was a Title VII sex discrimination case upholding privacy
interests of male employees regarding pat-down searches by female security guard at
plant exit.
107. 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
108. 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
109. 429 U.S. 589, 600 n.26 (1977).
110. Id., (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)).
111. See Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. Civ. RTS. Civ. LiB. L. REV. 233,
273 n.144 (1977).
112. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
113. M See also Gerety, 12 HARV. Civ. RTS. Civ. LIB. L. REV., supra note 110,
at 274-75 n.153.
As stated in note 8, supra, one of the duties of a nurse's aide was to bathe the
Home's guests. Although the female guests did not have an absolute right to demand
female nurse's aides for their bodily care under the right of privacy, the commentator
is nevertheless concerned that bathing of the female guests by male nurse's aides
would have been too "disruptive" of their personal intimacy. See Note, 84 HARV. L.
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Fesel for a female nurse's aide was not an interest constitutionally
protected by the right of privacy as the court held it to be.""
CONCLUSION
In Fesel the court examined the BFOQ exemption with respect
to sex discrimination cases as defined under Title VII. Fesel
broadened the applicability of the BFOQ exemption to encompass
the circumstance where a male nurse's aide would have cared for
female retirement home guests. The court's holding was an unfair
indictment of the professionalism of male nurse's aides and an unfair
assessment of the capacity for change in the sex-based prejudices of
retirement home guests. The holding also undermined EEOC guide-
lines which demand that Fesel should have been given an oppor-
tunity to demonstrate his capacity for the position, and that
customer preference be eliminated from BFOQ consideration. More-
over, cross-sexual care existed at the Home between female nurse's
aides and male guests; thus, the concern for the privacy rights of
the female guests appears a convenient excuse for discrimination.
Fesel also perpetuated existing social prejudices which Title VII
was designed to eliminate by holding, under an unwarranted
assumption, that the female guests had a constitutional right of
privacy which required protection. Under Title VII, the Home
should have been required to hire a male nurse's aide.
REV., supra note 43, at 1185-86. However, bathing of the complaining female guests
could have been scheduled when female nurse's aides were on duty, and most likely
the Home would not have incurred additional expenses.
114. Fesel must be considered as a case decided on constitutional grounds,
although the court bypassingly stated that the privacy interests of the Home's guests
were protected by tort and criminal law. 477 F. Supp. at 1353. The court gave no case
authority backing this claim and the cases it did use in its effort to establish that a
privacy right existed for the female guests were not tort or criminal cases, but Title
VII sex discrimination actions. Since Fesel never worked at the Home he never had
the opportunity to tortiously intrude upon or criminally violate the privacy rights of
the female guests. Unless a person violates a criminal statute or commits a tortious
act, there is no standing by the state or anyone else against that person because no
case or controversy exists. Thus, the privacy interests of the female guests at the
Home were not subject to relief under tort or criminal law because no controversy
materialized between them and Fesel. See generally LeBlang, 18 WASHBURN L. REV.,
supra note 68. The only privacy right the female guests had standing to allege would
be encroached upon by the employment of Fesel was the constitutionally guaranteed
right of privacy. Only the constitutionally based right of privacy could have been
balanced against the non-discrimination principle of Title VII in determining whether
the hiring of a male nurse's aide undermined the essence of the Home's operation.
Even if Fesel was employed at the Home and personal care contact occurred with the
non-consenting female guests, it would be up to a jury, not the court, to determine the
fact whether the guests needed the protection of tort or criminal law remedies. See F.
JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.10 (2d ed. 1977).
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Courts must take a more firm stand in favor of non-discrimina-
tory employment practices promoted under Title VII. Only then will
Title VII violations be remedied and discriminatory injustices like
those perpetuated in Fesel be extinguished. When an employer
seeks a BFOQ exemption in a Title VII action, his remonstration
countering alleged discriminatory employment practices must
undergo keen judicial analysis in order to upend and dispel subtle
stereotypic motives and beliefs pervading social mores.
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